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ABSTRACT

Two cabinet secretaries address the problems of when and how the United States should use military power. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger emphasizes the importance of prudence and restraint in the use of military force in chapter 1: "The Uses of Military Power." Secretary of State George P. Shultz stresses the vital importance of readiness to back up diplomacy with military power in chapter 2: "The Ethics of Power." Twelve well-known Americans respond variously to the positions of Weinberger and Shultz in Chapters 3-14. Chapter titles and authors are: "The Weinberger-Shultz Debate Is Dangerous" (Philip Geyelin); "The Weinberger-Shultz Debate Is Beneficial" (Smith Hempstone); "Christian Morality and U.S. Power" (Carl F.H. Henry); "Rules That Paralyze Action" (Thomas Molnar); "The Moral Purpose of Foreign Policy" (Richard John Neuhaus); "Diplomacy and the Limits of Force" (David D. Newsom); "A Just and Limited U.S. Defense Policy" (William V. O'Brien); "Taking Necessary Risks" (Roger L. Shinn); "Without Force, Life Would Be Impossible" (Seymour Siegel); "When Shall We Fight and How?" (Edward Teller); and "Afterword: Third World War" (Richard M. Nixon). (JP)

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Edited by Ernest W. Lefever

Ethics and Public Policy Center • Washington, D.C.



*"The Ambassador says he does not care what we have heard—he speaks
for both Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz."*

Drawing by Stevenson, © 1984 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

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Foreword

FROM ARISTOTLE, ST. AUGUSTINE, and Machiavelli to Lincoln, Churchill, and Reinhold Niebuhr, philosophers and statesmen have wrestled with the problems of morality and military power. These problems have been exacerbated in our time by the rise of militant totalitarianism, nuclear weapons, and international terrorism.

Late in 1984 an unusual thing happened—two cabinet secretaries in a reflective mood addressed the problem of military power in the face of current dilemmas confronting the United States. On November 28, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger spoke at the National Press Club in Washington on “The Uses of Military Power.” Two weeks later, on December 9, Secretary of State George P. Shultz addressed a convocation at Yeshiva University in New York on “The Ethics of Power.”

Weinberger’s speech is more detailed and concludes with six tests for the proper use of “U.S. combat forces abroad.” Shultz suggests three tests for the legitimate use of power.

Pundits seized upon the two speeches as evidence of an ongoing bureaucratic battle between the two secretaries. Seasoned observers recalled earlier turf struggles, such as those between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers during the first Nixon term, or between National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance under President Carter. Many welcomed the airing of differences as a stimulus to clarify U.S. policy toward Third World conflicts, international terrorism, and “gray area” confrontation between the Western alliance and the Soviet bloc.

To advance the debate, we asked a group of distinguished Americans to respond briefly to the Weinberger and Shultz speeches, focusing on the basic question: Under what circumstances should the United States use military force, ranging from general war to terrorism and subver-

sion? Has the United States *under-, over-, or misused* its power in recent years?

Eight responded, an intriguing mix of theologians, political scientists, philosophers, and one physicist. To their statements we added four previously published essays that address the key issues, including an afterword excerpted from former President Richard M. Nixon's book *No More Vietnams*, published in 1985. Together with the original Weinberger and Shultz speeches, these fourteen essays form a provocative tapestry of views on ethics and military power.

This pamphlet augments previous titles published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center designed to "clarify and reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian tradition" and contemporary issues. Related Center publications include *Morality and Foreign Policy: A Symposium on President Carter's Stance* (1977), a collection on that President's views toward the Soviet Union and U.S. responsibility; *The Apocalyptic Premise: Nuclear Arms Debated* (1982); and *The Grenada Mission: Crisis Editorializing in the 'New York Times,' 'Wall Street Journal,' 'Washington Post,' and 'Washington Times'* (1984).

In all Center publications the views expressed are those of the authors.

ERNEST W. LEFEVER, *President*
Ethics and Public Policy Center

Washington, D.C.
May 1985

1. *The Uses of Military Power*

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

NATIONAL POWER HAS MANY components, some tangible, like economic wealth, or technical pre-eminence, and others intangible, such as moral force, or strong national will. Military forces, when they are strong and ready and modern, are a credible—and tangible—addition to a nation's power. When both the intangible national will and those forces are forged into one instrument, national power becomes effective.

In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay two to three months by sea over the horizon. The United States was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.

Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. Yet so blurred have the lines become between open conflict and half-hidden hostile acts that we cannot confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared at any moment to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated terrorist acts to guerrilla action or full-scale military confrontation.

Alexander Hamilton, writing in the *Federalist Papers*, said that "it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national

This essay is taken from a speech given by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club on November 28, 1984.

exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." If it was true then, how much more true it is today, when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and individual terrorist action. And how much more important is it now, considering the consequences of failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of military force to defend terrorism has never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, conquer, or subjugate other nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other situations which fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use of force.

The Gray-Area Challenges

We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern paradox: the most likely challenge to the peace—the gray-area conflicts—are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed.

Because we face a spectrum of threats—from covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, to use of brute force—choosing the appropriate level of our response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been made and the purpose clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the purpose has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to accomplish.

The issue of which branch of government has authority to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making of foreign policy and in the decision-making process for the employment of military forces abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality of decision-making authority in the executive branch has

been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process. At the same time, there has not been a corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of military forces.

Yet the outcome of decisions on whether, when, and to what degree to use combat forces abroad has never been more important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict to its early stages, to contain and control it—but to do that our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner, and be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged, because many of those difficult decisions must be made extremely quickly.

Some on the national scene think they can always avoid making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid grappling with a complex issue because, despite the clever rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While they may maintain in principle that military force has a role in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the circumstance or the place where it would apply.

On the other side, some theorists argue that military force can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are American forces of any size present they will somehow solve the problem.

Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or satisfactory solutions. The first—undue reserve—would lead us ultimately to withdraw from international events that require free nations to defend their interests from the aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities as the leader of the free world, responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War II—a war, incidentally, that isolationism did nothing to deter. These are responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked throughout the world. In an international system

based on mutual interdependence among nations and alliances between friends, stark isolationism would quickly lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States: we would be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent nations.

The second alternative—employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts—would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric of our society, endangering the single most critical element of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.

Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, who would have an understandable opposition to being used—in every sense of the word—casually and without intent to support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their morale and their effectiveness in engagements we must win. And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would fall off, and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so wracked the country in the sixties.

We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have fought so hard to regain?

In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.

Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars, involving every aspect of our society. All our means of production, all our resources, were devoted to winning. Our policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the unconditional surrender of our enemies—the only acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our freedom.

But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we encountered a more subtle form of warfare—warfare in which, more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked. Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of “national liberation,” but far more frequently ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder.

Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open society, and our freedom of speech and opinion, to use alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends.

They realize that if they can divide our national will at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad. So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to intimidate Western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in their countries, because public opinion there is simply prohibited and does not exist.

Freedom: Challenge and Opportunity

Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is true that until democratic nations have the support of the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling message to friend and foe alike by the vote of their citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by re-electing a strong chief executive. They know that President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for his actions and is able to lead us through these complex times by insisting that we regain both our military and our economic strength.

In today's world, where minutes count, such decisive leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United States and our allies and then responding

appropriately. Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on our territory, and our response may not necessarily require the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our vital national interests and those of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety or forsake our allies.

At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them, usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.

We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory—without their strong invitation—when our own freedom is not threatened.

On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the United States has seen the need to join forces with other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with negotiations, and by separating warring parties, thus enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both to the Sinai and to Lebanon for just such a peacekeeping mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for combat; they were armed only for their self-defense. Their mission required them to be—and to be recognized as—peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so that they were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring nations, their peacekeeping mission could not be realized, then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the number and arms of our troops—in short, to equip them for combat—or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we faced just such a choice because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping.

In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary to commit our troops to combat, we must commit them in sufficient numbers and we must support them as effectively

and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.

Once it is clear that our troops are required because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just that.

Six Tests for Using Combat Forces

Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used. I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of the U.S. combat forces abroad:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.

2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces could then perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.

3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. We should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war—or, rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."

War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital

national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.

4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: “Is this conflict in our national interest?” “Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?” If the answers are “yes,” then we must win. If the answers are “no,” then we should not be in combat.

5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.

6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest possible number of our citizens. Those objectives must be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that may be required later. We must never forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged that “Danzig is not worth a war,” and “why should we fight to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?”

These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased negatively for a purpose. They are intended to sound a note of caution, caution that we must observe prior to committing forces in combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent—it is morally required.

In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should interpret what I am saying as an abdication of America's responsibilities—either to its own citizens or to its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal that this country, or this administration, is unwilling to commit forces to combat overseas.

We have demonstrated in the past that when our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those interests. Let no one entertain any illusions: if our vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that if we must fight, we must win.

So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have learned from the past, they also can—and should—be applied to the future. For example, the problems confronting us in Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize. If this happens we will clearly need more economic and military assistance and training to help those who want democracy.

The President will not allow our military forces to creep—or be drawn gradually—into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. This means we will need sustained congressional support to give confidence to our friends in the region.

I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist, incremental approach, which almost always means the use of insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being drawn inexorably into an endless morass where it is not vital to our national interest to fight.

But policies and principles such as these require decisive leadership in both the executive and legislative branches of government—and they also require strong and sustained public support. Most of all, these policies require national unity of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the policies and leadership to gain that public support and unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the strength of character to protect peace with freedom.

In summary, we should all remember these are the policies—indeed, the only policies—that can preserve for ourselves, our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.

I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs around the world. We can enable our friends in Central America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.

We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will enable all of us—ourselves at home and our friends abroad—to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.

2. *The Ethics of Power*

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

UNTIL THE DAY COMES when the law-abiding nations of the world put an end to terrorism and to the barbarism that threatens the very foundations of civilized life, we will all have to wrestle with the dilemmas that confront moral people in an imperfect world. As a nation, we once again face the moral complexity of how we are to defend ourselves and achieve worthy ends in a world where evil finds safe haven and dangers abound.

Today's terrorist hijacking in Teheran makes this topic especially relevant, but in fact, it is an old issue. Philosophers and sages have grappled with it for centuries, engaging the great questions of human existence: what is the relationship between the individual and his or her God, between the individual and his or her community, and between one's community and the rest of the world? How do we make the difficult moral choices that inevitably confront us as we seek to ensure both justice and survival? The Bible and the commentaries in the Talmud provide many answers; they also leave many questions unanswered, which accurately reflects the predicament of humankind.

As Americans, we all derive from our Judeo-Christian heritage the conviction that our actions should have a moral basis. For the true source of America's strength as a nation has been neither our vast natural resources nor our military prowess. It is, and has always been, our passionate commitment to our ideals.

Unlike most other peoples, Americans are united neither by a common ethnic and cultural origin nor by a common set of religious beliefs. But we are united by a shared commitment to some fundamen-

This essay is taken from a speech given on December 9, 1984, by Secretary of State George P. Shultz before the convocation of Yeshiva University in New York.

tal principles: tolerance, democracy, equality under the law, and, above all, freedom. We have overcome great challenges in our history largely because we have held true to these principles.

The ideals that we cherish here at home also guide us in our policies abroad. Being a moral people, we seek to devote our strength to the cause of international peace and justice. Being a powerful nation, we confront inevitably complex choices in how we go about it. With strength comes moral accountability.

Here, too, the intellectual contribution of the Jewish tradition has provided a great resource. The Talmud addresses a fundamental issue that this nation has wrestled with ever since we became a great power with international responsibilities: how to judge when the use of our power is right and when it is wrong. The Talmud upholds the universal law of self-defense, saying "If one comes to kill you, make haste and kill him first." Clearly, as long as threats exist, law-abiding nations have the right and, indeed, the duty to protect themselves.

The Talmud treats the more complicated issue as well: how and when to use power to defend one's nation before the threat has appeared at the doorstep. Here the Talmud offers no definitive answer. But it is precisely this dilemma that we most often confront and must seek to resolve.

Relating Power and Diplomacy

For the world's leading democracy, the task is not only immediate self-preservation but our responsibility as a protector of international peace, on whom many other countries rely for their security.

Americans have always believed deeply in a world in which disputes were settled peacefully—a world of law, international harmony, and human rights. But we have learned through hard experience that such a world cannot be created by good will and idealism alone. We have learned that to maintain peace we had to be strong and, more than that, we had to be willing to use our strength. We would not seek confrontation, but we learned the lesson of the 1930s—that appeasement of an aggressor only invites aggression and increases the danger of war. Our determination to be strong has always been accompanied by an active and creative diplomacy and a willingness to solve problems peacefully.

Americans, being a moral people, want our foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation. But being a practical people, we also want our foreign policy to be effective. And, therefore, we are constantly asking ourselves how to reconcile our morality and our practical sense, how to relate our strength to our purposes—in a word, how to relate power and diplomacy.

How do we preserve peace in a world of nations where the use of military power is an all-too-common feature of life? Clearly, nations must be able to protect themselves when faced with an obvious threat. But what about those gray areas that lie somewhere between all-out war and blissful harmony? How do we protect the peace without being willing to resort to the ultimate sanction of military power against those who seek to destroy the peace?

Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are distinct alternatives. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. The truth is that power and diplomacy must always go together or we will accomplish very little in this world. Power must always be guided by purpose. At the same time, the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength will always be ineffectual at best, dangerous at worst.

As we look around the world, we can easily see how important it is that power and diplomacy go hand in hand in our foreign policies.

In the Middle East, for instance, the United States is deeply and permanently committed to peace. Our goal has been to encourage negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time we have an ironclad commitment to the security of Israel. We believe that Israel must be strong if a lasting peace in the region is to be achieved. The Israeli people must be sure of their own security. They must be sure that their very survival can never be in danger, as has happened all too often in the history of the Jewish people. And everyone in the region must realize that violence, aggression, and extremism cannot succeed, that negotiations are the only route to peace.

In Central America, aggression supported by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union threatens the peace and mocks the yearning of the people for freedom and democracy. Only a steady application of our diplomatic and military strength offers a real hope for peace in Central

America and security for the hemisphere. We have sought a dialogue with the Nicaraguan leadership. We have given full support to the Contadora peace efforts. We have provided political and economic support to those in the region who are working for peace and freedom. But we have also provided defense assistance to the region to help establish a shield behind which effective diplomacy can go forward.

The Great Seal of our country shows the eagle with its two talons. In one is an olive branch, and the eagle is looking at the olive branch, signifying our desire for peace and reconciliation. But in the other are arrows, symbolizing just this point that I have made.

In our relations with the Soviet Union and on the issue of arms control, diplomacy alone will not succeed. We have actively sought negotiation with the Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides, but we have also continued to modernize our own forces to ensure our security and that of our friends and allies. No arms control negotiation can succeed in conditions of inequality. Only if the Soviet leaders see the West as determined to modernize its own forces will they see an incentive for agreements setting equal, verifiable, and lower levels of armament.

The Legitimate Use of Power

The need to combine strength and diplomacy in our foreign policies is only one part of the answer. There are agonizing dilemmas inherent in any decision to use our power. But we do not have to look hard to find examples where the use of power has been both moral and necessary.

A week ago an election was held on the island of Grenada—the first free election held in that country since 1976. If we had not shown the will to use our strength to liberate Grenada, its people would yet be under the tyrant's boot and freedom would be merely a dream.

Grenada is a tiny country. Although there were some tough actions, as military campaigns go, it was quickly done. But the moral issue it posed was of enormous importance for the United States.

What we did was liberate a country, give it back to its own people, and withdraw our forces. We left, even though Grenadians begged us to stay. The American people understood immediately that we had done something good and decent in Grenada—something we could be

proud of—even if a few Americans were so mistrustful of their own society that they feared any use of American power. I am thankful that the President had the courage to do it. Grenada was a tiny island and relatively easy to save. But what would it have meant for this country—or for our security commitments to other countries—if we were afraid to do even that?

We have to accept the fact that often the moral choices will be much less clearly defined than they were in Grenada. Our morality, however, must not paralyze us. Our morality must give us the strength to act in difficult situations. This is the burden of statesmanship.

And while there may be no clear resolutions to many of the moral dilemmas we will be facing in the future, neither should we be seduced by moral relativism. I think we can tell the difference between the use and abuse of power. The use of power is legitimate:

- Not when it crushes the human spirit and tramples human freedom, but when it can help liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom;
- Not when it imposes an alien will on an unwilling people, but when its aim is to bring peace or to support peaceful processes; when it prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or oppression; and
- Not when it is applied unsparingly, without care or concern for innocent life, but when it is applied with the greatest efforts to avoid unnecessary casualties and with a conscience troubled by the pain unavoidably inflicted.

Our great challenge is to learn to use our power when it can do good, when it can further the cause of freedom and enhance international security and stability. When we act in accordance with our principles and within the realistic limits of our power, we can succeed. And on such occasions we will be able to count on the full support of the American people. There is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance. Grenada shows that a president who has the courage to lead will win public support if he acts wisely and effectively. And Vietnam shows that public support can be frittered away if we do not act wisely and effectively.

Americans will always be reluctant to use force. It is a mark of our decency. And, clearly, the use of force must always be a last resort, when other means of influence have proven inadequate. But a great

power cannot free itself so easily from the burden of choice. It must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction as well as for the consequences of its action. In either case, its decision will affect the fate of many other human beings in many parts of the world.

One need only consider again the tragic result of the failure to use military force to deter Hitler before 1939. If the democracies had used their power prudently and courageously in the early stages of that European crisis, they might have avoided the awful necessity of using far greater force later on, when the crisis had become an irreversible confrontation.

Those responsible for making American foreign policy must be prepared to explain to the public in clear terms the goals and the requirements of the actions they advocate. And the men and women who must carry out these decisions must be given the resources to do their job effectively, so that we can count on success. If we meet these standards, if we act with wisdom and prudence, and if we are guided by our nation's most fundamental principles, we will be a true champion of freedom and bulwark of peace.

If one were looking for a model of how nations should approach the dilemmas of trying to balance law and justice with self-preservation, one need look no further than Israel. It is not that Israel has made no mistakes in its history. In this world, that is too much to ask of any nation. But the people of Israel, in keeping with their tradition, have engaged in open, continual, and enlightened debate over the central question of when it is just and necessary to use power. It is all the more praiseworthy when one considers the great perils to its survival that Israel has faced throughout its history. Its need for strength should be self-evident; yet Israelis never consider the issues of war and peace without debating terms of right and wrong.

We in America must be no less conscious of the moral responsibility inherent in our role as a great power and as a nation deeply devoted to justice and freedom. We look forward to the day when empire and tyranny no longer cast a shadow over the lives of men and women. We look forward to the day when terrorists, like the hijackers in Teheran, can find not one nation willing to tolerate their existence. But until that day comes, the United States will fulfill the role that history has assigned to us.

The United States must be a tireless sentinel of freedom. We must confront aggression. We must defend what is dear to us. We must keep the flame of liberty burning forever, for all mankind.

Our challenge is to forge policies that keep faith with our principles. We know, as the most powerful free nation on earth, that our burden is great, but so is our opportunity to do good. We must use our power with discretion, but we must not shrink from the challenges posed by those who threaten our ideals, our friends, and our hopes for a better world.

3. *The Weinberger-Shultz Debate Is Dangerous*

PHILIP GEYELIN

AGAINST THE GRIM BACKDROP of a murderous terrorist act [the December 1984 terrorist hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner in Teheran], Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger have been indulging themselves in a dangerous public debate that has many of the qualities and serves about as much useful purpose as a cockfight. The instinct to kick and scratch is built into their bureaucracies. In the capital cockpit, there is no lack of audience or promoters for blood sports. But their combat is contrived. It can be stopped by high authority.

So where's the chief?

The question is not a cute carry-over from the presidential campaign. All the post-mortem polls tell us that Ronald Reagan was most valued for "leadership." And yet the administration has allowed the public impression to set in that there is deep division between the two top national-security figures on the fundamental issue of when the United States might feel compelled to use its military power—either broadly or narrowly—to counter terrorism.

It began with a major policy speech by Weinberger on November 28, emphasizing the importance of prudence and restraint in the use of military force. In a follow-up on December 9 that had the inescapable look of a calculated response, Shultz stressed the vital importance of being ready to use U.S. power to back up diplomacy. The *New York Times* headline: "U.S. Must Be Ready to Use Its Power, Shultz Declares." The subhead: "Differing With Weinberger, He Says Public Support Isn't Prerequisite for Action."

Philip Geyelin is a nationally syndicated columnist (© 1984, Washington Post Writers' Group; reprinted by permission).

Now, all that Shultz said was that "there is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance" for the use of American military power. Weinberger hadn't said there was. He had simply said that "before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance" of public and congressional backing; the operative words were "some" and "reasonable."

Now guess who said the following: "Public support for U.S. military actions to stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act or in retaliation for an attack on our people is crucial if we are to deal with this challenge."

If you guessed it was Weinberger, your faith in the consistency of high officeholders is touching, but misplaced. Shultz said it in a speech back in October in which he also said that the "prerequisites" for a sound counterterrorism strategy "must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of actions."

The point is not whether Shultz and Weinberger see eye to eye. With inherently different responsibilities, interests, constituencies, and roles, secretaries of state and defense rarely do. The point is that when they are allowed to carry institutional conflicts of purpose to the level of ambiguous public argument, not just the American public and Congress are confused. Allies are baffled. And adversaries are encouraged to miscalculate American intentions and resolve with potentially dangerous consequences.

Conventional wisdom has it that Weinberger and Shultz parted company over Lebanon. Shultz wanted an American military presence to reinforce his "peacekeeping" diplomacy. Weinberger didn't like the military odds, the indefinite purpose, the look of a losing proposition. This was no secret.

So it was easy enough to find evidence of deeper differences in their recent speeches. Grinding overtime, the rumor mills have them at odds on arms control, East-West trade, handling of relations with the Atlantic Alliance, Central America. Some say their clash is personal as well as philosophical. Others find it odd for the secretary of state to seem to want more forceful U.S. military presence and intervention while the secretary of defense seems to want less.

But historical perspective suggests it would be odd if it were otherwise. Diplomats are in the business of easing tensions, nurturing alliances, making commitments to protect threatened friends. All this

argues for arms control, East-West commercial contact, sensitivity to allies' concerns—and the deterrent effect of credible U.S. military power. With resources and capabilities always in mind, the Pentagon tends to worry more about giving up too much on arms control or high-tech transfers; about the security of U.S. forces in Europe; about getting sucked into unpopular, "unwinnable" wars—with not just Vietnam but Korea in mind.

Though Dean Acheson was vilified for excluding South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific and thus "inviting" the Korean War, the line was drawn by the Joint Chiefs and publicly proclaimed almost a year before Acheson's famous National Press Club speech on January 12, 1950—by General Douglas MacArthur. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took the lead in committing the United States to defend the host of countries with security pacts rimming Communist-bloc countries. Lyndon Johnson regularly credited Secretary of State Dean Rusk with being readier than Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara "to hit" North Vietnam.

There is, then, a familiar ring to the strains now showing between Shultz and Weinberger, and also an obvious remedy. If they cannot compose their differences quietly in the interests of a crucial coherence to policy, who but the President can?

4. *The Weinberger-Shultz Debate Is Beneficial*

SMITH HEMPSTONE

IN THE ONGOING DEBATE between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz concerning the effective and moral use of military force as an instrument of national policy, Mr. Shultz, a chubby and most unlikely hawk, is leading on points.

The two Cabinet heavyweights had sparred many rounds before on the subject, most notably in Cabinet discussions on American policy in Lebanon, Grenada, and Nicaragua.

But Mr. Weinberger, whose access to the ear of Ronald Reagan dates back to the days when the President was governor of California, escalated and codified the debate last month when he promulgated the six-point "Weinberger Doctrine."

Enunciating this doctrine, which reflects the thinking of the majority of the senior officers of the four uniformed services, Mr. Weinberger held that military action by the United States forces is justified:

- only as "a last resort," when all other methods have been exhausted.
- only when the use of force "is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies."
- only when troops can be committed to combat "wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning."
- only when "clearly defined political and military objectives" exist.
- only when the "size, composition, and disposition" of the forces committed matches the determined objective, and

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- only where there are prior reasonable assurances that "we will have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress."

There is much wisdom and common sense in the Weinberger Doctrine. But Mr. Shultz, returning to the fray on December 9 in a speech delivered at New York City, displayed the more subtle mind of the two when he put his finger on a glaring weak point:

"There is," Mr. Shultz reminded us, "no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance."

For while it is true that Americans are moral people who want the country's foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation, Americans, as the General Motors television ad states, also are very much "into winning."

Americans like their military operations to be quick, cheap, and, above all, clearly victorious. And it helps if the hats for the bad guys are very black indeed, and those of the good guys are alabaster white. Hold the nuances, forget the ambiguities: an Agincourt such as Grenada will do just fine.

But, as Mr. Shultz points out, "a great power cannot free itself so easily from the burden of choice. It must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction as well as for the consequences of its action."

This is an extremely important point, and one frequently overlooked. Millions of lives would have been saved and the world would be a better place today had the World War II allies not insisted on the simplistic idiocy of the "unconditional surrender" of Germany, which benefited no one but the Soviet Union.

That the allies refused even the harshest terms to any government that might succeed that of Hitler gave the German resistance movement small encouragement to plot against the Nazi leaders, and compelled the German generals to fight on for months after they knew the war was lost.

The burden of choice was there, and the allies flunked the test.

More recently, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is far from certain the the Russians would have crushed those liberation movements if the United States had shown itself prepared to use military force to prevent the Kremlin from so doing. American inaction

cost the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian people their slim chance of escaping enslavement.

The point is that moral men in an imperfect world, under the pressure of events perhaps only partially understood, sometimes make wrong choices. But America, as the leader and last best hope of the Free World, has an overwhelming obligation at least to confront and consider such choices.

Sometimes a president who intuitively understands his people will have to act before he has the support of the people and the Congress, bringing them along after him. That, after all, is what leadership is all about.

The Weinberger-Shultz debate, unlike so much that takes place here in Washington, has been conducted with intelligence and without acrimony by both men. The republic can only benefit from the airing of great issues such as this, which are the stuff of which public policy is made.

5. *Christian Morality and U.S. Power*

CARL F. H. HENRY

LIKE IT OR NOT, human history is sinful history. Statesmen talk about more justice than they achieve or even intend to achieve. The problem is not simply that international policy devoid of self-interest would contribute to the demise of one's own nation. It is rather that excessive self-interest infects all human proposals and solutions.

This baneful fact does not, however, render all policy choices equally objectionable. Even if none is ideal, some policies are more meritorious than others, and one particular policy can be superior to all alternatives. The role of politics is to pursue means of conflict resolution that avoid war, but not at any price.

Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz have addressed several highly important concerns, but they are second-level issues: (1) the limits and obligations of U.S. power "in the post-Vietnam era"; (2) the tests for legitimate use of American power abroad; and (3) whether a modern democracy can preserve the secrecy necessary to be militarily effective. Lest we glide into Machiavellian relativism or settle for ethical platitudes, their discussion is best prefaced by some comment on the broader concerns of morality and power.

The international scene would be less disconcerting if we could categorize all challenges to world stability (including Central America) in terms of military protection or self-determination (as in Grenada), or diplomatic eagerness to avoid precipitous involvement or precipitous disengagement (as in Vietnam). Historical events, however, seldom accommodate quantum leaps in foreign policy or decisive solution by the sudden display of military might. In Central America the present

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political situation grows increasingly unacceptable, yet nobody wants another Vietnam. Hence, it seems to involve internally self-contradictory dimensions.

No world power lives wholly unto itself. The American colonial ideal, understandably, was independence and isolation. As the nation gained global significance, its international indifference was confronted and altered by the decline of Great Britain as a world power, by German and Japanese aggression, by the Russian revolution with its ambitions for a Communist world, by the increasingly interlocking global economy, and by the advent of the space age. These developments challenged American wealth and power, and new totalitarian and dictatorial forces placed democracy everywhere increasingly on the defensive.

Without unity of purpose and lucid goals, foreign policy will vacillate and sooner or later be perceived as merely a quest for political advantage. Without moral ends and means, no policy will be regarded as ethically right. The decline of moral legitimacy into sheer utilitarianism is best avoided by relating the foreign and domestic policy debate to the quest for freedom and peace.

In a democracy, the effective power of government depends upon citizen response to facts shared by the elected representatives. Partisans of rival views readily mount public protest, and the mass media welcome this drama of confrontation and division. The efficient international use of political and military force requires a strongly supportive national will. A morally divided nation is no match for a powerful monolithic state. Communism continually exploits the diversity so freely expressed in democratic societies.

In moments of crisis, elected representatives cannot always wait to solicit a popular mandate for national response to provocative acts of aggression or terror. To do so would make public their intentions. While the need for congressional support and for the subsequent endorsement of popular opinion remains a wholesome constraint on specific alternatives, leaders with political expertise and appointed advisors must assist a president in reaching prompt decisions.

A democratic society's greatest strength lies in its voluntary religious and ethical reserves. The unity of American society has traditionally been rooted in Judeo-Christian principles. Concern for freedom and justice and peace and for human rights and duties, has a biblical basis.

The just and holy God who discloses his moral purpose in history and society provides a transcendent understanding of the good person and the good community. Nothing moves the spirit of human beings to voluntary cooperation more than the truth that God is man's Maker and Judge.

Some recent diplomacy, unfortunately, seems not to recognize the political potency and relevance of religious beliefs. Moreover, the humanistic platitudes about freedom, justice, and peace lack moral credibility against the pretensions of an absolute secular state. A costly by-product of the cultural impact of secular humanism is the misconception that separation of church and state implies national independence from God and moral absolutes.

The Alternatives

The world powers today face the alternatives of general nuclear war, totalitarian subjection, or pragmatic coexistence. The first option is inappropriate morally and militarily, though the Soviet Union rejects this premise. Hence a repudiation of any and all reliance on nuclear weapons by the United States may abandon the globe to international aggression and terrorism. Ironically, the very weapons capable of restraining totalitarian aspirations are also the weapons that could destroy democratic alternatives. The renunciation of nuclear missiles is understandably tied to verifiability, which some experts consider a vain hope. Thus the danger multiplies of slipping into an immoral use of power.

Christians know that the only ultimate and permanent solution is beyond the capacities of fallen mankind. The ultimate solution lies beyond history. Within human reach are proximate and contingent solutions achievable within God's providential purposes in universal history. To probe and promote such alternatives is the duty of civil government. The informed Christian knows that God is at work in the history of man and nations. Biblical history encourages us to believe that divine providence at times achieves—in and through and alongside our dedicated efforts—something that otherwise seems humanly impossible. A dimension of mystery impinges on international politics where prescribed patterns are largely absent, institutional forums are inadequate, and transcendent providence is operative. The theist's

confidence is that a preliminary divine judgment of nations is already under way, that unjust powers sooner or later slip off the map, and that a final universal judgment is inevitable.

The present pursuit of peace on earth has two major dimensions, one religious and the other governmental. Church and civil government each have an indispensable duty and mission.

The church seeks to save fallen mankind through personal regeneration and spiritual renewal. Thus it proclaims the universal will of the Creator and confronts inordinate self-interest by those larger community concerns that make for prudent self-interest. The church in its own fellowship demonstrates what loving obedience to a just and merciful God implies. Biblical realism rules out a narrow nationalism as well as all utopian schemes, whether through pacifist or military means. At best the state suspends or delays international hostilities; it cannot eliminate them. Pacifism, predicated on an unjustifiably optimistic view of human nature, is likely to yield a less durable suspension of conflict, since it continually invites aggression by predatory powers. The military option sees the worst in man and prepares for the worst; hence it is likely to be more devastating when conflict comes.

The only relief from this historical tension lies in political policies that restrain injustice and promote order. An effective political strategy will publicize, condemn, delay, and even frustrate the worst manifestations of injustice. By their acts governments will give credence to the claim that they fulfill a moral role in history. Such acts nourish the conviction that a transcendent ethical purpose will ultimately triumph and strengthen mankind's resolve to advance it.

Fallibility in the Political Realm

Political decisions that flow from these high assumptions will not, however, be infallibly right. A theistic morality will guard us from arbitrariness and moral relativism, and will provide a framework that promotes consistency. Yet in the arena of international commitments we are not dealing with moral perfection. Neither kings nor presidents cabinet members, neither theologians nor philosophers, are endowed with infallibility in the political realm. The decisions and deeds that flow from moral principle always reflect something less than impartial judgment. The inferences one makes from governing principles may be

fallible. One may misread historical contingencies. Statesmen seldom have all the facts they need to act in a fully responsible way. One's contemplation of the international good involves certain assumptions about national interest (and not infrequently also a leader's own political interest). One cannot foresee all the consequences of one's acts. No less disconcerting is the fact that values can be arranged in a variety of hierarchies, so that the application of principles justifies some flexibility.

Yet it is one thing to act answerably to divine judgment in view of the changeless ethical purposes of God and of providential history, and quite another to act in accord with an inflexible ethical code. It is better to be contingently wrong for the right reasons than to be momentarily lucky in the absence of rational and moral principles.

The United States more than any other world power in modern times has voiced its distaste for military aggression and sought to avoid an overuse of power. Predatory states can easily misread this commitment as a lack of resolve. The civilized world can no longer tolerate the growing network of international terrorism, the violent and barbarian extension of guerrilla warfare in the absence of a formal declaration of war. In principle, it invites preemptive strikes to protect civilization's values. Governments that sponsor terrorism should not be exempt from such strikes to discourage their support of terrorism.

Military power, whether limited or maximized, should be proportional to the goals that call forth its use. Noble ends will justify the means provided only that the ends condition and inform the means. The United States is the democratic bearer of a major share of responsibility for the world community in which states will inevitably accommodate to Soviet power if we remain unattentive to their legitimate interests. Yet we cannot become caretakers of the planet. Our first duty must be to be strong—morally, economically, and militarily—if we are to help ourselves and others. We also have a duty to use national assets responsibly for the good of the nations. Moral example is a nation's noblest export.

6. *Rules That Paralyze Action*

THOMAS MOLNAR

THE SPEECHES BY Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger send us back to the starting point: What should U.S. foreign policy be like? The question reminds me of another that I was asked some years ago at a symposium on education: "What is education and why do we educate?" My answer was that if the assembled experts and professors did not know the answer, we should call it a day and leave the meeting hall. The same reply applies to the present question: if we must redefine the nature of foreign policy at every turn, then obviously we have not learned from thousands of years of history.

The two speeches ought to have been helpful for the evaluation of American power since they emanate from authoritative sources. Yet they are not helpful because they essentially repeat American rhetoric by Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, and Cyrus Vance, reflecting the confusion and hesitation that have marred our foreign policy ever since 1945. The speeches again illustrate the fact that one superpower pursues a brutal but realistic policy, varnished over with an ideological verbiage that never hinders, and in fact promotes, diplomatic and military action; the other superpower gropes in the dark, without a clear consciousness of its role, hiding its perplexity behind a pious, moralizing, and self-debilitating discourse.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the speeches do not address themselves to the concrete world situation and a realistic pattern of action; their attempt is rather to mollify domestic opinion, especially its powerful manipulators. Accordingly, Messrs. Shultz and Weinberger do not speak of U.S. foreign policy in the so-called post-Vietnam era; rather, they *beg* the opinion-molders of America to tolerate a modest place for the nation's diplomatic and military lead-

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ership. No "new page" has been turned, no "post-Vietnam era" has been initiated.

Like other orators before them, Shultz and Weinberger remain at light-years' distance from the overdue task of outlining a program, or even an approach to a well-conducted foreign policy. They merely reflect the puritanical state of mind, with deep roots in American attitudes, that conceives this nation's mission as that of saving mankind from evil and sin. When evil nevertheless prevails—as after our defeat in Vietnam and after each of our retreats—then instead of formulating a geopolitically concrete plan, we get busy setting the stage for yet another morality play. Accordingly, the argument in both speeches rests, not on a program of resisting the enemy thrust, but on a number of magic words: peace, democracy, morality, consensus, doing good, flexible response, gray areas of conflict, vital (but undefined) interests, consultation, and popular support. This is incantation, not political discourse. The distinguished Lebanese diplomat Charles Malik summed it up in simpler terms in April 1984: "Everybody knows that America does not want to fight."

Although we are still committed to being a superpower, Mr. Weinberger practically apologizes for America's having an army and for the eventual use of that army in combat. He reassures mankind (and Moscow) that if we ever, ever send the boys to fight, we will think it over a hundred times beforehand, in committees and consultations, setting conditions not for the enemy but for ourselves. Mr. Weinberger's "six tests" seem to be spoken by the proverbial boaster in the bar: "Hold me, or I beat him up!" Anyway, the "tests" beg the whole question of our military involvement, because they enumerate enough "ifs" and "buts" to nullify any possibility of America's ever going to war again. For example, we are supposed to decide whether an armed intervention is "vital" to our interests, but this decision itself is countermanded in advance by being made dependent on precisely those forces—congressional majority, public opinion, leftist media—that promote America's weakness, either by an invincible ignorance or by ideological conviction. The conclusion is foregone. The parade of empty words is no substitute for firmness. Moscow will not be frightened by Mr. Weinberger's rhetoric; not even Jane Fonda will.

The limits of action by a great power are its obligations: to block enemy advance and protect itself and its allies. In this respect it is

hazardous to speak, as Weinberger does, of "gray areas of conflict," referring to terrorism and subversion. Such activities are also part of the enemy's arsenal; while dealing with them necessitates no full deployment of our forces, deal with them we must, because both action and lack of action on our part show the exact measure of our determination or undecidedness on larger issues.

Should we then address ourselves to the question "when and under what circumstances should the United States use military force"? The question invites an advanced and ready-made formula that leads us back to Dean Acheson's fateful speech, which excluded South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter. But precisely: we must resist our legalistic bent, which loves to formulate and circumscribe permissible action. Foreign policy is no mere police intervention where the officer's course of action is prescribed by (an often paralyzing) law, nor is it a prefabricated game. Foreign policy has no laws and rules (what are the "rules" in a hostage crisis, in Soviet arming of the Sandinistas, in the shooting down of the South Korean passenger plane?) other than the national interest, tempered *when possible* by the general inclination to decency, neither binding nor enforceable if lacking. When the national interest is at stake, it takes clear precedence over ethical commands; in fact, it is included in ethical commands. This is what history and the example of Christian nations over the centuries teaches. If we believe that we, as a nation, are "more moral" (Weinberger's and Shultz's contention) than history's average, we are guilty of pharisaism and our hubris cries indeed to heaven.

Thus nobody can or should set down ground rules for the commitment of American military forces; such rules will either paralyze action or be discarded under the pressure of urgent circumstances. After our failure in 1962 to dislodge Castro from Cuba, who would have imagined, with our non-interventionist rules in mind, that President Johnson would land troops in the Dominican Republic (1965), and President Reagan in Grenada (1983)? These actions were worthy of a great power; why shackle America in the future?

Messrs. Weinberger and Shultz may think of their performance as an exercise in modest meditation about human affairs. I regard it as arrogant, because it is based on the belief that America is expected to redefine the human condition and its immemorial rules of action. Remember Senator William Fulbright's recommendation that, as a

great power, America ought to show the world that power does not mean its imperial use. Yet it *does* mean its imperial use, as Grenada and the deployment of the Pershing missiles illustrate. Trying to evade such decisions and choices, or making them depend on "consensus," is the surest way of fulfilling Che Guevara's prediction of what it will take to destroy U.S. power: "two or three Vietnams"—or Beirut and Managuas.

7. *The Moral Purpose of Foreign Policy*

RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS

THE CONVENTIONAL SUGGESTION that the Secretary of State has revealed himself as a "hawk" and the Secretary of Defense as a "dove" is neither useful nor plausible. From the viewpoint of those who identify themselves as doves in our society, both secretaries are painfully hawkish. Both are committed to a strong military. Secretary Weinberger's more cautionary note is, it seems clear, designed to husband that strength and prevent the military from being "used" in a profligate manner. Secretary Shultz is underscoring what I presume Secretary Weinberger would not dispute: namely, that military strength is a constant component in diplomacy and that adversaries must always be kept in a state of a "certain uncertainty" about just when and how military strength might become a more active component. Weinberger addresses identifiable developments called military actions or wars; Shultz addresses the constant of military potential or threat in the politics between nations.

The addresses are alike, however, in their noteworthy stress of the moral component. It might be an interesting exercise to examine Weinberger's "tests" and his entire statement in the light of the traditional Christian criteria for a "just war." He mentions "last resort," for example, and dwells on the classical criterion of "legitimate authority" as it relates to democratic governance and support. In line with such traditional thinking about these matters, Weinberger speaks of a specifiable before-and-after change, from peace to war (or, as he puts it, "the use of U.S. combat troops abroad.") Shultz, as befits a diplomat, is more impressed by the shadowed ambiguities of power politics in

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which the lines between persuasion and coercion, between influence and force, are usually obscured. But both emphasize that without moral purpose and will, neither military action nor diplomatic-cum-military influence can succeed.

Shultz waxes eloquent on the moral purpose that must inform that moral will. "The United States must be a tireless sentinel of freedom. We must confront aggression. We must defend what is dear to us. We must keep the flame of liberty burning forever, for all mankind." He tells us that "the United States will fulfill the role that history has assigned to us," and surely some heard "history and history's God" and were reminded, to their comfort or unease, of earlier affirmations about America's manifest destiny. Weinberger, on the other hand, is not so specific about the moral purpose, contenting himself, for the most part, with repeated references to "the national interest." At the same time, he insists that this national interest is not limited to the tangible and material but most certainly includes the moral and spiritual.

It is, to say the least, difficult to set forth the moral purpose of America. Perhaps this is a difficulty inherent in democracy. There are grave problems with Shultz's assertion that "the ideals that we cherish here at home also guide us in our policies abroad." We live in a society, but not in a world, that is democratic by constitution and habit. Perhaps the democratic impulse and aspiration is universal, and it should be U.S. policy, as Shultz suggests, to enable all peoples to act upon that impulse and aspiration. That indeed is a noble and ambitious understanding of the moral purpose of America's influence in the world. One problem with it, however, is that it probably has little support among the American people.

Among the leaders of our mainline churches, for example, there is scant support for the kind of grand vision Shultz sets forth. Such statements are dismissively referred to as "mere rhetoric." Or, if it is thought that they are really meant to be taken seriously, they are cause for alarm. Witness the furor over President Reagan's remark about the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," a remark that is simply the other side of what Secretary Shultz says about freedom and democratic virtue. Not only in our churches but throughout our several cultural elites, the sentiments expressed by Shultz are thought to be quaint and outdated or, if they really do guide our policy, arrogant and, yes, evil.

In another sense, the way we think about our ideals at home does guide attitudes toward American policies abroad. Elite and popular thinking about democracy typically does not rise above a facile "tolerance" based on the belief that everyone should be permitted to do his own thing. This is not the stuff of moral purpose. In addition, there is a widespread assumption that the way we live is somehow the normal, taken-for-granted, human situation. Most people have not read Solzhenitsyn; they do not really believe that there is an ominous alternative that is perhaps the more "natural" way in which societies are ordered. And, if they do believe it, they are hesitant to say so out loud, lest they be accused of being anti-Communist.

In sum, the moral purpose to which both secretaries appeal is hard to find or define in American culture today. The ideals of liberal democracy are condemned from the left as bourgeois illusions and from the right as secular permissiveness. Perhaps that moral purpose—in the form of a vibrant public philosophy for a democratic society—can emerge only in the face of a massive threat that, at least in part, forces it to define itself. This is what happened in World War II when Hitler powerfully concentrated Western minds on the ideals of democracy. This is what is largely missing from the addresses of both Shultz and Weinberger. Perhaps they think that the ominous alternative to democratic governance "goes without saying." If so, I think they are mistaken. Today the ominous alternative is not emphasized often enough and does not sufficiently shape the American mind. The secretaries are surely right in underscoring constancy (Shultz) and caution (Weinberger) with respect to military power. A still more convincing statement would address more fully, in addition to constancy and caution, the ideal that military power is to help defend and advance.

8. *Diplomacy and the Limits of Force*

DAVID D. NEWSOM

THE CURRENT DEBATE BETWEEN the United States secretaries of state and defense over the use of power is worthy of a great democracy. The two men, with major responsibilities, are seeking to answer a fundamental question.

The debate, however, seems to center on the use of—or the threat of—military power. To suggest that diplomacy is successful only if it is clearly backed up by the capacity and the intention to use force is to ignore many other effective forms of power. It is to suggest that the chess champion is successful only with a loaded pistol under the table.

The debate centers today on our response to three challenges to our national interests: the confrontation and competition with the Soviet Union, the conflict in Central America, and the terrorism in the Middle East. In none of these situations does the existence or the threat of military force, in itself, guarantee diplomatic success.

Some suggest that the Soviets have agreed to return to negotiations on arms control because they sense the growing military strength of the United States.

Undoubtedly the successful deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, despite Soviet opposition, and the increased defense effort in the United States are factors in the Soviets' decision. But other factors cannot be excluded: their assessment of European opinion, economic pressures in the Soviet Union, fears of American unpredictability, the outcome of the U.S. election, calculated self-interest, and, perhaps, even a genuine desire to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

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The circumstances in Central America and the Middle East, in particular, illustrate the limits of the application of military force to diplomacy. In the former case, the United States must overcome the sensitivities and fears created in the area by past uses of military power. While it can be argued that the Nicaraguans are negotiating with the United States out of fear of the contras or of another Grenada, it can also be argued that the creation and support for the contras and the Grenada action have awakened reactions of resentment and suspicion that make effective diplomacy more difficult. The linkage of force to diplomacy, particularly in problems in smaller nations, always runs the risk of awakening fanaticism that resists, even at great sacrifice, an effort to impose an outsider's will.

The shadowy sources and support for terrorism in the Middle East seem to frustrate both force and diplomacy. Those who carry out terrorist acts appear immune to normal threats and fears.

Effective force requires not only a precise target but one that will respond by ceasing its offending action. The only likely subjects either for either diplomatic appeals or forceful actions are governments in the region. The links of many terrorists to a government are not sufficiently substantiated to make either approach an effective option. To attack the capital or military forces of a Middle Eastern country without a clear provocation could risk the loss of wider objectives such as limiting Soviet power or seeking peace.

Diplomacy requires not so much a threat of force as a basis for establishing a common interest in curbing terrorism. It is doubtful that any Arab government or Iran has the capacity today to suppress terrorist movements totally, even if the desire existed. The issue is further complicated by an undercurrent of sympathy in the region for the causes, if not the methods, of the terrorist. Like guerrillas, they swim in a sympathetic sea. Even under pressure, leaders and governments may fear to oppose these movements. If U.S. diplomacy has a role, it is to change that climate so that the legitimate goals of the peoples of the area are identified with the presence of the United States. It is difficult to see how diplomacy that further emphasizes our readiness to use force would accomplish that objective.

The exercise of power in support of diplomacy is a subtle, not a blunt, instrument. The threat, as perceived by a diplomatic adversary, may be the use of military force, or it may be the possibility of

economic pressures, diplomatic isolation, or a fear of ideas in a controlled society. Whatever the element of pressure, it must convince leaders that the threat of terrorism is real to them, that they can control it with minimum risk, and that identification with U.S. goals is to their benefit.

For the United States to conclude that its diplomacy is effective only if linked to the threat of force is to ignore the strength of its ideas and the power of those who can create by patient persuasion and the application of subtle pressures a sufficient recognition of common interests to curb violence and control conflict.

9. *A Just and Limited U.S. Defense Policy*

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN

WHAT DOES CASPAR WEINBERGER mean when he says that the ends of our defense policy must be American "vital interests"? The term "vital interests" is, at the very least, controversial, and certainly more limited than the broad commitments that have governed American policy over the past forty years. NATO and other collective agreements, as well as American action in defense of South Korea and Vietnam, were founded, as George Shultz put it in his speech, on a perception of America's role as a "tireless sentinel of freedom" and "the protector of international peace."

Those concepts and commitments were valid, but Weinberger seems to regard the Vietnam War and campaigns like it as a mistake, the kind of war to be avoided. It is to be hoped that what he objects to is not the just cause for U.S. intervention in Vietnam but, rather, the way that the war was fought and the failure to sustain popular support for it. Nevertheless, his allusion to Vietnam is troubling because America's military intervention may reflect both a moral commitment and the pursuit of vital interests without necessarily receiving a great deal of public support. Since 1945, United States policy has tended to hold that resistance to aggression, particularly communist aggression, was *prima facie* a matter of American vital interests. It remains unclear whether Weinberger accepts this view or whether he sees a gap between core U.S. interests and the general commitment, reiterated by Shultz, to resist aggression wherever possible.

The United States saw its vital interests at stake when it resisted Communist aggression—direct in Korea, indirect and direct in Viet-

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nam. But the United States also acted in principled resistance to aggression in the belief that peace is indivisible, that aggression unrestrained breeds more aggression, and that great power engenders great responsibility for deterring and resisting aggression. Continuation of this perspective is clearly encouraged by Shultz; it is implicitly questioned by Weinberger. The key to Weinberger's calculus of American commitment to military intervention is U.S. vital interests, not resistance to aggression against others. Shultz, however, adds a strong normative element to Weinberger's prudential counsels. No one questions the U.S. right of self-defense. Granting that it is difficult to judge the relation of that basic right to the assumed duty of resistance to aggression against others, Shultz enjoins us to continue our defense of just causes beyond the bare limits of immediate self-defense and self-interest. In my view, self-interest and community interest, if not identical, are very close when it comes to deterring and resisting aggression. To defend an ally against aggression is to act both in the community's and in one's own true self-interest, as well as to live up to one's moral commitments.

Since American vital interests are not defined by Weinberger and their relation to collective deterrence and defense is left unclear, this is a subject that requires further reflection and debate. To be sure, Weinberger shows by his references to Central America that U.S. vital interests and principled resistance to aggression may coincide. Still, the question of future U.S. participation in the collective self-defense of countries in other regions threatened with Communist and other aggression remains more controversial after Weinberger's call for caution.

Weinberger also reviews issues of means in U.S. defense policy. He says virtually nothing about nuclear deterrence and defense, leaving untouched the issues debated in response to the American Catholic bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace." These issues deserve authoritative discussion by Weinberger and other American officials, the more so because of the revival of arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the speech in question here, Weinberger confined himself primarily to the issues of U.S. military intervention in Third World conflicts. His referents are Korea and Vietnam in the past, possible U.S. military intervention in Central America, the Middle East, and other Third World areas in the present and future.

Contemplation of these kinds of military action leads both Weinberger and Shultz to encourage overdue public discussion of the meaning of limited war (primarily Weinberger) and just war (primarily Shultz). Weinberger and Shultz revive the kind of debates occasioned by U.S. participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as in NATO and other collective defense systems. These debates were all influenced by the specter of nuclear war, but they also reflected rejection of many aspects of "total war" as waged in World Wars I and II. Even setting aside the nuclear threat, twentieth-century total war was criticized by thinkers such as Raymond Aron and Basil Liddell-Hart precisely because modern total war violated the very Clausewitzian principles to which Weinberger appeals. Total war, wherein means tend to escape control and popular passions are deliberately inflamed to produce a fanatic war spirit, is at odds with the Clausewitzian concept of war as an instrument of politics. (In passing, Mr. Weinberger should be corrected regarding his rendering of modern history that equates World Wars I and II. While both wars tended to be "total" by the standards of their time, World War I did not end with "unconditional surrender," nor did that war threaten "our survival as a free nation," as Weinberger states.)

The 'Intention of Winning'

Moreover, total war tends to violate just war limits on legitimate use of force, e.g., in disproportionate and indiscriminate destruction and in encouraging hatreds that render near impossible the "right intention" that the just belligerent must possess. Does Weinberger call for total war policies? Certainly not. However, his formulation of the goals of U.S. military action opens the door to those who are satisfied only with "victory," e.g., World War II-type victory or Roman-style *debellatio*. His second test for committing U.S. forces to combat insists that this must be done "with the clear intention of winning."

This can mean "winning" in the limited-war, Clausewitzian sense of accomplishing the legitimate political-military objective with means consistent with the principle of economy of force and the moral/legal principle of proportion. If this is Weinberger's meaning, he is clearly in the tradition of just and limited war. However, to adherents of World War II-type total war leading to unconditional surrender, "winning"

means victory in the manner of 1945. In our nuclear age this is probably an impossible as well as a potentially suicidal objective. In the coming debate this crucial distinction between limited war and total war must be maintained.

If the better strains of contemporary U.S. policy prevail, the synthesis of Weinberger's and Shultz's prescriptions will hold that the United States must continue, where possible, to deter and resist aggression. To do so should be seen both as fulfillment of a moral commitment and the pursuit of American vital interests. U.S. recourse to armed force should always conform to the requirements of just and limited war, in which ends and means are proportionate and discriminate and the underlying objective is the creation of conditions leading to a just and lasting peace. Neither the goals nor the means enjoined are, however, necessarily acceptable to the American people in any particular conflict.

Is Public Support Essential?

Thus the remaining question is whether the American people can prepare for and, if necessary, fight wars other than total wars such as World War II—to some, “the last just war.” Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz speak to this question. Weinberger, reflecting the post-Vietnam bitterness of the American military, makes home-front support an absolute condition for committing American troops to combat in foreign wars. Shultz, quite sensibly, observes that popular support cannot be guaranteed in advance. Shultz implies, further, that those with executive responsibilities should do what must be done and then do their best to explain and justify their actions so as to obtain public support. There is a difference, very possibly a conflict, in these views. Both reflect common sense and experience. Can they be reconciled?

I believe that the reconciliation will be difficult but not impossible. Weinberger makes an essential point. It is certainly necessary to clarify political/military objectives and the rationales for military actions taken in pursuance of them. It will also be critical to improve U.S. doctrine, policies, and assets relating to military intervention in mixed revolutionary/international conflicts in the Third World. If objectives and means are clearly explained, public acceptance may follow—particularly if U.S. actions are successful. Indeed, success is probably

more important than clarity of ends and means. But success is often slow and elusive in these wars, and perseverance is usually essential.

If American military intervention is truly necessary in terms of U.S. vital interests and moral commitments, Shultz is right in insisting that leaders should lead, not wait for congressional support, favorable polls, or plebescites to authorize right and necessary actions. A government can prepare for military contingencies, but it cannot stock assured popular support on a shelf. Public support will usually have to be marshalled after crucial decisions have already been made. At that point, can public support be obtained for the kinds of inconclusive and messy wars that may well be unavoidable for a great power?

The answer must not be a return to total-war propaganda and behavior. This would make just and limited war difficult if not impossible. The American public will have to mature and learn to live with limited war. Meanwhile, events will not stand still while we try to mature. If crises come requiring U.S. military action, some combination of Weinberger's insistence on clarity of ends and means and Shultz's call for responsibility must suffice to persuade a free society to support its government when it acts once again as "tireless sentinel of freedom." If the American public does not respond, the day may come when it no longer will enjoy the rights of a free society, nor will it be expected to assume the burdens of the leader of the Free World.

10. *Taking Necessary Risks*

PAUL SEABURY

WINSTON CHURCHILL ONCE SARCASTICALLY TOLD some of his myopic generals that in strategic matters one sometimes must take the enemy's possible plans into account. I was reminded of this remark when reading the speeches of Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger on morality, prudence, and military power.

Weinberger sets forth very clear limits on the use of American power. As I read him, the chief ones are: before going to war, be sure you have strong public support; if you go in, go in to win; don't dawdle in limited conflicts with aims less than victory; above all, use combat force as a "last resort."

These dicta seem to have been conceived in a vacuum. We may draw up rules governing our behavior in contingencies, but how much freedom of choice does the status quo defender have against a persistent aggressor? When John Foster Dulles, for instance, told an audience in 1954 that in the event of aggression the United States should retaliate at "times and places of its own choosing," the public reaction was immediate and hostile; Dulles recanted.

Weinberger clearly has a bad case of the Vietnam syndrome. That is something with which I deeply sympathize; it is no wonder that the American military leaders today do not wish a recurrence of the time when not only the "anti-war" movement but the "folks back home" abandoned them. But a set of rules derived from a particular war cannot bind a nation's subsequent judgment on war and peace. Weinberger in part seems to realize this. "We cannot," he says at the commencement of his essay, "confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what direction aggression may arrive." He even stresses

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the bleak "consequences of failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible," and elsewhere points to the famous 1936 Rhineland incident, where the French and British democracies failed to defy (and to deter) Hitler by challenging his violations of the 1919 Versailles Treaty. But the Secretary of Defense still urges in his seventh commandment that force in combat be used only as a last resort. Perhaps someone should tell Mr. Weinberger that you can't eat your crow and have it too.

With respect to victory as the object, Weinberger's revival of this important concept is admirable; it is surely preferable to the abject renunciation of victory as goal by those American strategists who specialize in "conflict management" and "peacekeeping," as though war were simply a form of crowd-control. Yet here, too, there is no consideration of the possible natures of choice: if the time and place of attack is determined by the aggressor, the choice for the victim is stark—fight or submit. It may, of course, be that submission is the more prudent course of action, but that is not the way the secretary phrases the problem.

In questions of war and peace we always see through a glass darkly. But most people who study our current national-security situation see—as does Weinberger himself—the likeliest future as one of "gray zone" conflicts, or what others call "low-intensity conflicts." If one's prudent aim is to win in such contests, rather than to fall back "incrementally," and if one wishes such success, what is to be done? One approach is to deter with credible threats; another to offer sufficient aid to others for them to succeed as proxies for us.

Weinberger's views on this have been clear for a long time as far as Central America is concerned, but unfortunately this important subject is not directly addressed in his speech. Central America now presents a crucial strategic dilemma—the likelihood of regional U.S. ground combat involvement increases as America's "gray zone" aid to our democratic friends, chained by our irresolution and inconsistencies, continues to be insufficient, and as our declared purposes waver ambiguously between contras and Contadora, between firmness and appeasement.

As for those "gray zone" contests where the initiative of aggression typically is taken by the USSR, the question of our long-term strategic response is critical. In Central America and the Caribbean, what astonishes the observer is the vast array of Soviet and pro-Leninist

proxy forces—Cuban and North Korean soliders; Vietnamese, Libyan, East German, and Bulgarian financial and military aid—while Congress wrings its hands at U.S. aid to the contras and to government forces in El Salvador. If this process of deterioration continues, the U.S. freedom to choose rationally, which the secretary prefers, will narrow to very unpleasant choices that are not so “gray.”

Finally, Weinberger here does not speak to the matter of executive duties under the Constitution. The president as commander-in-chief must always anticipate the lonely task of deciding when and where force should be used, with little or no time to speculate on public moods and attitudes, or even congressional views. Sometimes necessity also presses the chief executive to prevarication bordering on duplicity. (President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940–1941 proved to be a master of this.)

Given the nature of the public's often erratic behavior on the eve or occasion of crises, how can heroic enthusiasm be marshalled or tricked out of the nation in order to defend it and its freedoms? In 1951, W. H. Auden in his poem “The Managers” described the essence of statesmanship:

*To rule must be a calling,
It seems, like surgery or sculpture, the fun
Neither love nor money
But taking necessary risks, the test
Of [their] skill, the question,
If difficult, their own reward.*

11. Conventional Doctrines and New Realities

ROGER L. SHINN

WHEN CABINET OFFICIALS give public addresses, they are part of an administration with a posture and a program. They are trying to rally support for positions already taken or about to be taken, which makes it unlikely that they would air their doubts in an effort to educate society and themselves. In a sense, there is a screen between the private beliefs of such speakers and their audience. If the officials are known to have differences of opinion, the public, guided by eager pundits, can search for hidden or not-so-hidden agendas or guess at the murky image behind the screen, as people do whenever Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz speak. But mostly the public expects and finds an act of advocacy.

In less formal conversations of scientists, weapons specialists, and career military officers, there is a different mood these days. There is more openness about perplexities, more awareness of dilemmas, more doubts about inherited political and military dogmas. There is open acknowledgment that war, if it means strategic nuclear war, is no longer the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Such war is suicidal—because it invites a reply in kind and because the attack alone may produce an annihilating “nuclear winter” even if there is no response.

Strangely, Weinberger and Shultz in these recent speeches seem almost unaware that with thermonuclear weapons the human race has entered a new era of history. Other public figures—e.g., Robert McNamara in the United States and Lord Solly Zuckerman in the United Kingdom, to mention two who know a lot about weapons and war—are quite clear on the point. They know that nuclear warheads are

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not weapons of war, that they have no usefulness except for deterrence, and that the present system of deterrence is terribly fragile.

But Weinberger makes only a quick passing reference to "this nuclear age," and his only observation about it is that now "we measure time in minutes rather than months." Shultz touches the subject only by implication when he hopes for "agreements setting equal, verifiable, and lower levels of armament." No doubt both could answer me saying that not every speech should be about nuclear weapons. I agree. Historians reckon that the world has experienced more than a hundred wars since World War II, including some very big wars by all traditional standards, but no nuclear wars. That information refutes all those who assume that contemporary war must inevitably be nuclear war. But efforts to think about international political and military relations, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, cannot go very far if they totally neglect the new dimensions of war. That is why these two speeches seem a nostalgic fondness for the days (which both mention) when a more resolute stand might have stopped Hitler earlier.

I'd like to catch each speaker in a moment of candor and ask, "Do you have any deep perplexities? What are your doubts about your own position? Can you level with me on that?" The conventional rules of political pronouncements forbid replies to such questions. The answers might be taken as signs of weakness. For myself, I'd find more credibility in political leaders who, like all the people I trust, acknowledge their uncertainties. I don't put much value on opinions of people who cannot question their own dogmas.

Secretary Shultz gives signs of being a person who can enter honest conversation, but how does he know that "the law-abiding nations of the world will put an end to terrorism"? That's a nice belief, but far from self-evident. However, Shultz has some awareness that moral choices are "difficult," that they engage "the great questions of human existence," that unanswered questions are part of "the predicament of humankind," that "there may be no clear resolutions to many of the moral dilemmas we will be facing in the future," yet that we must make decisions and act, sometimes "with a conscience troubled by the pain unavoidably inflicted." Anyone who can say those things knows something about the nature of human life and history.

Secretary Weinberger, although like Shultz he talks of "gray areas," seems insecure with ambiguity and rushes to sharp dichotomies. He likes total contrasts between Soviet expansionism and U.S. defense, between foreign dictatorships and domestic democracy, between manipulative and democratic societies, between conflicts that do and conflicts that do not affect vital interests. He is more comfortable with abstractions than with the untidy stuff of real history. His is a world of winners and of losers. Ten times in one speech he uses the words "win" or "winning." Does he really think that the real world is like that? Would he honestly want a clear winner and loser in the war between Iran and Iraq? Or is it only when the United States goes to war that the good outcome is "unconditional surrender" of the foe?

Weinberger comes closer to reality when he recognizes that "conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict." This is not a world where nations can set clear goals and move unswervingly toward them. If he were to build on that insight, he might learn to qualify some of his more frequent dogmatisms.

Both secretaries are right when they recognize that elements of power—including military power, though not only that—are inherent in international relations. But if that is a beginning, it is surely not the summation of political wisdom. The answer to threats of aggression is not simply to give in, but neither is it to make enemies of people who should be our allies. In parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific, the very people who resonate most strongly with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States now frequently resent us because they see our government as the ally of oppressive regimes. Weinberger and Shultz, without ignoring our geopolitical antagonists, would be wise to pay more attention to the way we often turn old and potential friends into antagonists.

12. Without Force, Life Would Be Impossible

SEYMOUR SIEGEL

IF MEN WERE WITHOUT SIN, force would never be necessary. But given the real situation of human nature, without force life would be impossible. As the rabbis in the Talmud observed, "were it not for the fear of the government [and its potential use of force] men would swallow each other up alive." Force or the threat of it is indispensable to deter aggression, to free the oppressed, and to protect the legitimate security of national states.

The question, therefore, is not whether to use force or not to use force. The question is when and how much force to use in specific situations.

One of the lamentable lessons of history is that the absolute reluctance to use force does not lead to peace. It is not force that leads to debacle, but rather, in many instances, reluctance and vacillation that lead the potential aggressor to wreak his havoc. This lesson was taught to us so bitterly by the lessons of the 1930s. For example, those who expressed their understandable disdain for violence and bloodshed by taking an oath never to fight for "king and country" were tragically destined to fight valiantly for king and country, many to lose their lives and limbs. While we pray for peace, we have learned that we can preserve it by preparing for war, by praying that our strength will deter the would-be aggressor.

Secretary Shultz puts the matter very starkly: "we all have wrestled with the dilemmas that confront moral people in an imperfect world."

The use of force, by legitimate authorities, is both moral and necessary. I would underscore four points, some of them touched upon by the secretaries:

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1. *Force is a last resort.* We can use deadly force only when everything else has failed. The devices we are allowed to use are diplomacy, economic sanction, and international organizations. If none of these succeed, then we can use force to protect our national interests. Violence, because it is deadly, is a last resort—not the first option.

2. *There should be a difference in our readiness to use conventional force and nuclear force.* The former is destructive but will not destroy the whole planet; the latter has an apocalyptic quality, adding new dimensions to the problem. The use of atomic weapons should be forbidden, except as self-defense or as retaliation if we are attacked. Otherwise, our nuclear weapons are limited to a role of deterring would-be aggressors (who will not launch any “adventure” if they know that unacceptable nuclear retaliation is in store for them). The possession of atomic firepower presents us with the problem—never intending to use it, but at the same time persuading our adversaries that we might in retaliation. This threat provides a credible deterrent. This new problem in national strategy is not discussed in the excellent statements of Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz.

3. *We should use power or combat force in foreign lands only when legitimate authority has requested us to use it, and then only on behalf of our friends.* Insurgency against a dictatorial or totalitarian regime presents a special ethical issue. If we can aid our “freedom fighters” financially or diplomatically, it is difficult for us to condemn such assistance by other governments.

4. *The use of force must be supported by a national consensus.* Half-hearted support, internal conflict, and division can harm a nation as much as a negative outcome of the conflict we are trying to quell. Even totalitarian governments have to pay some attention to public opinion.

The United States has been judicious in the use of force, though its reluctance to respond more vigorously to acts of international terrorism can be criticized. I am not sure of the formula to be used in these tragic cases, but I do know that threats to use forceful means followed by failure to carry them out are not the right way.

13. *When Shall We Fight and How?*

EDWARD TELLER

BY 1945 U.S. MILITARY POWER had been transformed. In earlier times, our ocean barriers protected us, but by the end of the Second World War, that was no longer true. We were then, as we are now, a part of a close-knit world community, and any idea of even temporary isolation is obsolete. In this respect, our policy must become more like that of other powers. The fact that our days of "splendid isolation" are gone requires the sort of rethinking that has hardly been completed in official circles, much less in public perception.

The problems we face have both moral and practical dimensions. Though they are entirely different approaches and their influence is not always harmonious, to neglect either dimension would lead to imbalance.

Morally speaking, our democracy cannot fight effectively unless the people's will is united. Indeed, it is difficult in a democracy to define morality other than its being the well-considered and united will of the people. Americans were truly united in only one war—the Second World War. As a result we performed miracles, ranging from the rapid construction of Liberty ships to the production of the atomic bomb. In the First World War, when unity was less complete, we did not manage to deliver even a fraction of the war materiel ordered from us. The case of Vietnam is a frightening example of how a war in which we hold all the material advantages can be lost through disunity, mismanagement, and systematic disinformation by much of the media. The lessons are obvious.

The practical dimension is more involved and equally important. Here a far-sighted policy is the first requirement. Grenada serves as a

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splended example of how nipping trouble in the bud is by far the best alternative, and it also shows the importance of decisive action by the president.

The principle can be generalized to include emphasis on more drawn-out preventive action carried out by limited means before a full crisis develops. Strong action in El Salvador remains essential and could be extended to other parts of Central America. The emphasis is not on precipitous escalations, but on the possibility of using limited force in a timely fashion.

That such actions might be at variance with public opinion is an unfortunate fact. This is one of the most difficult problems facing us in our free society. Look at Afghanistan. The Soviet offensive in that country has produced millions of refugees. Even modest assistance could have remarkable results, but we are turning a deaf ear to their plight. As in the case of Czechoslovakia after Munich, it may be for us that the bell tolls.

The crucial focus, of course, should be on potentially major conflicts, starting, for instance, in the Middle East or the Caribbean. Here our decision to emphasize deterrence is well taken. The current issue is to determine what kind of deterrence should be practiced. Two distinct types are available to us.

The first is deterrence by proxy, corresponding to the Soviet practice of attack by proxy. One prospective trouble spot is the Middle East. It is impossible that the Soviets, having set a trap, will take over a region that deeply affects the interests of the Free World and the Third World. Once the crisis arises, armed resistance by the United States will be hopeless, and therefore should not be undertaken.

We can strengthen deterrence by strengthening Israel. The Israelis must resist if they want to survive. Locating military supplies in Israel under temporary American control, similar to the early World War II Lend-Lease procedures, may be an excellent measure. Our sending rapid deployment troops halfway around the globe to fight superior Soviet forces in their own backyard would be sheer folly. Indeed, I doubt that the Israelis would ask for such an intervention.

Similarly, in Nicaragua, aid to the contras could be highly rewarding. I have talked to a naturalized Cuban who goes down every second weekend to treat the wounded. He reports that the Sandinistas can draft people, but many defect with their arms. He is worried about how the

government uses Soviet helicopters to bomb unarmed villages—a fact unreported by our press.

The second type of deterrence involves our primary objective, which, of course, is and remains the prevention of a full-scale war. And as part of that deterrence, we must be prepared for the most extreme scenarios, for example, powerful Soviet forces in Western Europe or Mexico. That means following President Reagan's advice and shifting from our past policy of deterrence plus retaliation to a more substantial emphasis on general defense.

Neglect of this approach has led to an underestimation of its possibilities. Furthermore, it is at this point that practicality and morality merge. Preparations for defense will, in the end, secure much wider acceptance among the American people than preparation for retaliatory measures. Premature and uncorrected pronouncements by prestigious scientists on topics where they lack expertise have done untold harm—partly because they are organized (e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists) and partly because they have access to the media. Informed opinion is suppressed by our government's policy of excessive secrecy.

We must realize that we live in a technological age that propels us with increasing rapidity into an uncertain future. Attempts to turn the clock back, especially unilaterally, are futile. So is reliance on Soviet declarations. The best approach is to harmonize technology with the wishes of the American people and with obvious moral principles. We can do this and exercise caution if we do not shy away from all technological innovations, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Should new developments be adapted not to mass destruction but to the elimination of attack when it has already begun, deterrence and global stability both will be greatly strengthened.

14. Afterword: *Third World War*

RICHARD M. NIXON

THE THIRD WORLD WAR BEGAN BEFORE World War II ended. Saigon's fall ten years ago was the Soviet Union's greatest victory in one of the key battles of the Third World war. No Soviet soldiers fought in Vietnam, but it was a victory for Moscow nonetheless because its ally and client, North Vietnam, won and South Vietnam and the United States lost. After we failed to prevent Communist conquest in Vietnam, it became accepted dogma that we would fail everywhere. For six years after Vietnam, the new isolationists chanted "No more Vietnams" as the dominoes fell one by one: Laos, Cambodia, and Mozambique in 1975; Angola in 1976; Ethiopia in 1977; South Yemen in 1978; Nicaragua in 1979.

Since President Reagan took office in 1981, America's first international losing streak has been halted. But the ghost of Vietnam still haunts the debate over aid to the government of El Salvador and to the anti-Communist contras in Nicaragua. If we fail to halt Soviet support of aggression in our own hemisphere, we will have little hope of doing so when our interests are threatened in other parts of the world. We must purge ourselves of the paralyzing sickness of the Vietnam syndrome if we are to avoid other defeats in the battles of the Third World war.

Nobody wants another Vietnam. Because they fear that any U.S. intervention in Third World countries might lead to another Vietnam, the new isolationists contend that the United States has no strategic interests in the Third World that would justify the use of our military power, and that we should limit our role to foreign aid programs and diplomatic initiatives. They are wrong.

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We must be concerned with what happens in the Third World because of the enormous strategic and economic stakes involved. Two-thirds of the world's people live in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Those countries have natural resources that are indispensable to the industrial nations of the West. United States trade with Third World countries last year was \$175 billion—equal to our trade with Western Europe and Japan combined.

We must be concerned because it would be the height of immorality to stand by and allow millions of people to suffer the fate of the people of Vietnam and other Third World countries that have had repressive totalitarian regimes imposed upon them.

We must be concerned because the greatest threat to peace today is in the Third World. Since the end of World War II, there have been 120 wars in which ten million people have been killed. Except for the Falklands in 1981 and Greece in 1947, all of these wars began and were fought in the Third World. British military strategist B. H. Liddell Hart's famous maxim is "If you want peace, understand war." If we want peace, we must also understand the Third World, because it is there that an incident is most likely to occur that would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union . . .

Never in history has there been a conflict as broad-based and as pervasive as the Third World war. It challenges us to rethink all of our time-tested assumptions about the nature of war and aggression. If we insist upon preparing for today's war by mounting yesterday's defenses, we are doomed to defeat. Today the important battles are not along borders but in remote villages and small countries whose names few Americans have heard. In pinpointing aggression, it is no longer enough to look for the smoking gun; now we must look for the hidden hand. We must become more aware of the role the Soviets and their surrogates play in instigating and supporting insurgencies against non-Communist governments.

Some Popular Misconceptions

We must begin by disabusing ourselves of some popular misconceptions about how to deal with conflicts in the Third World.

At one extreme there are those who insist that if we are strong enough militarily, we will be able to meet and defeat any challenge we

face. It is true that our overwhelming nuclear superiority was one of the factors that enabled us to stop Communist aggression in Korea. But with that superiority gone, the fact that we have far more accurate and powerful nuclear weapons today than those we had during the Korean War is irrelevant in Third World conflicts. Great nations do not risk nuclear suicide to defend their interests in peripheral areas. And superior conventional forces will not prevail against an enemy who wages unconventional war. Helping a government stop a violent revolution militarily without helping it deal with the economic conditions that helped spawn the revolution would buy only a short-lived victory. After one revolution was put down, another would take its place.

At another extreme are those who say that poverty is the problem, and that instead of providing military aid to ensure security, we should provide economic aid to promote progress. There are only half right, and therefore all wrong. I recall the year 1947, when President Truman asked for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey to meet the threat of Soviet-supported Communist guerrillas in Greece. Along with those of other congressmen, my office was flooded with hundreds of postcards reading, "Send food, not arms." We resisted the pressure and voted for the Truman program. If we had sent food only and not arms, Greece would be Communist today. The lesson of the Greek experience is that in the short run there can be no progress without security. But we must also recognize that in the long run there can be no security without progress.

Still others naively contend that diplomacy is the answer to armed conflicts in the Third World. Diplomacy cannot succeed without military power to back it up. For example, when President Carter ruled out the use of force at the outset of the Iranian hostage crisis, he weakened the effectiveness of diplomacy to resolve it. The pathetic failure of the League of Nations and the United Nations to play a significant role in keeping peace or ending wars is striking proof of the impotence of diplomacy without power.

There is too much of a tendency to see all Third World conflicts as part of the larger conflict between East and West. While the Soviet Union profits from most of them, it is not responsible for all the conflicts in the world. As one observer has pointed out, their policy is to trouble the waters and then fish in them.

A strategic consensus against the Soviet threat in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf may prove useful in some conflicts; but without

the Soviet Union's playing a role at all, there would still be war between Iran and Iraq, and fighting between Israelis and Arabs. The most violent and dangerous forces in the Mideast are not Communist revolutionaries taking orders from Moscow but Moslem fundamentalist revolutionaries egged on by Khomeini and Qaddafi.

It is an illusion, however, that if the Soviet Union does not play a role in a Third World conflict, our interests are not threatened. The Soviets do not have to fight to win. Whether they fight or not, wherever we lose, they win. Khomeini's revolution in Iran had nothing to do with Communism or the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that the Soviets did not benefit from it. When the Shah of Iran was driven from power, the United States lost its strongest ally in the Mideast. Had he remained in power, the war between Iran and Iraq and even the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union might never have taken place. Because a strong, dependable, pro-Western regime was replaced by an unpredictable, extreme, anti-Western one, the balance of power shifted against us and toward the Soviets. The Shah's downfall, like the fall of South Vietnam, was in part the result of the failure of the United States, his longtime ally, to back him when he needed it most. As a result, in each case the Soviets scored an important victory in the Third World war.

Soviet Exploitation of Trouble Spots

Instability is the Soviet Union's most powerful ally in the Third World war. Soviet leaders scan the globe for potential trouble spots, places where people are groping for a better way or suffering through episodes of unrest, and then find ways to make those bad situations worse. While the Soviet Union is not behind all violent revolutions, it is first in line to pick up the pieces when they are over. Instability—both the fact of it and the fact that the Soviet Union profits from it—threatens our interests, wherever it occurs in the world. . . .

Helping a country prevent a Communist regime from gaining power is difficult. It is even more difficult to help anti-Communist forces in countries where the Communists have already gained power. It is tempting to proclaim boldly that we will help anyone anywhere who fights against a repressive Communist regime, but we must recognize the limits of what we can do. We must not make the tragic mistakes we

made in Hungary in 1956 and at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, where we encouraged revolutions against Communist regimes and then failed to support our friends when they came under attack from superior forces. The test should be whether there is some reasonable chance for success. The anti-Communist Savimbi forces in Angola, for example, would meet this test. The freedom fighters in Afghanistan also deserve support, especially because this is the only leverage we have on the Soviets to mitigate their repression in that country.

The Soviets cannot have it both ways. If they have a right to support Communist "liberation" forces in non-Communist countries, we have an even greater right to support true liberation forces in Communist countries. In Nicaragua we should help the contras as long as the Sandinistas continue to support the guerrillas in El Salvador. A more difficult question arises if the Nicaraguan government agrees to discontinue that activity. In that case, we will be justified in continuing aid to the contras only if we are prepared to see it through in the event that they come under attack from superior forces.

The successful operation in Grenada served three important purposes: It rescued Americans whose lives were in danger; it removed the possibility of another Soviet base being constructed in the Caribbean; and most important, it erased some of the feeling of impotence we developed after the fall of Saigon. But while Grenada demonstrated that we could still do something on the world stage, it did not prove that we could do everything. Public support for the Grenada operation was high because it was over quickly, casualties were light, and the immediate provocation—the threat to American lives—was clear. Overcoming 600 lightly armed Cubans on the beaches of Grenada is a far different task from the one we would confront if we had to fight 50,000 Sandinistas, armed with Soviet heavy weapons, in Nicaragua.

But while it would be dangerous to assume that Grenada proved we could do everything, it is even more dangerous to assume that because we failed in Vietnam, we will fail everywhere. We must not allow our failure in Vietnam to blind us to the stark reality that without military power and the will to use it surgically and selectively in crucial Third World battles, we will lose the Third World war.

The reluctance of our military leaders to be bogged down in another Vietnam is understandable. It is not surprising that current military doctrine rules out the commitment of our military forces unless the

following conditions are met: The actions must be "vital to our national interests" or those of our allies; we should commit forces only as a last resort; when we commit our troops, we must do so with the sole object of winning; the war must be winnable in that we have the means to achieve our goal of victory; and we must have assurance of support by Congress and the public.

No one can question these conditions if they are properly defined. But some go so far as to contend that our vital interests are involved only if there is an attack on our allies in Europe and Japan, a threat to our oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, or a threat against our close neighbors to the south. They are wrong. Our vital interests are affected by what happens in other parts of the world as well.

Israel is a case in point. Most military experts would agree that our interests would be affected if there were a threat to Saudi Arabia and the oil supplies of the West. On the other hand, Israel has virtually no oil. It is smaller than the state of Massachusetts. Only 4 million of the 100 million people who live in the Mideast live in Israel. It is not a formal ally of the United States. It could therefore be argued that Israel is not one of our vital interests. Yet when Israel has been attacked, every American president has made it clear that we would use military power to prevent Israel's defeat. Our interest in Israel's survival extends beyond the profound moral issues involved and the fact that Israel is an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarian states. Israel's regional presence and substantial military capability make its survival an important interest of the United States. And we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union is providing virtually unlimited arms to some of Israel's enemies.

Although it might not technically qualify as a vital American interest, most Americans understand both the moral and strategic reasons for our steadfast support of Israel. In the Third World war there will be other small countries where our interests, and the interests of the people of those countries, may be served by U.S. assistance in their efforts to resist Communist aggression. If we define our vital interests too narrowly solely out of fear of getting involved in another Vietnam, we run the risk of abandoning millions of people to totalitarianism and, eventually, of losing the Third World war.

No one can quarrel with the proposition that we must not use military force unless we have the means to achieve our goal of victory.

But we must recognize that where our interests are clearly involved, we must take risks to protect them. Every military operation cannot be a sure thing. The United States is a great power with worldwide responsibilities. We will not prevail against an enemy willing to take any risk to achieve victory if we are unwilling to take some risks to prevent defeat.

International Terrorism

The same principle applies to international terrorism. Some urge restraint in retaliating against terrorism because of the admittedly significant risk of casualties among civilians, hostages, and our military personnel. But while we cannot act in every instance of terrorism, we should always act decisively when we know who is responsible and where they are. Otherwise we give carte blanche to these international outlaws to strike again. If one group of terrorists succeeds in intimidating the United States, others will be encouraged to try, and more lives will undoubtedly be lost as a result. Swift, timely retaliation, even if there is some risk to innocent people, will mean that other terrorists will be less likely to threaten and kill innocent people in the future. Repeated threats to retaliate that are not followed by action are counterproductive. A President of the United States should warn only once.

Wars cannot be waged without the support of the Congress and the people. But there are times when the Congress and the people may not recognize our vital interests in Third World conflicts. Leaders should lead and not just follow uninformed public opinion. It is their responsibility to educate the people and the Congress about where our vital interests are and then gain support for whatever military actions may be necessary to protect them. Leaders who do only what opinion polls indicate uninformed voters will support are not true leaders, and if America follows them, it will cease to be a great nation. Trotsky once wrote, "You may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you." Uninformed people may not be interested in affecting what goes on in the Third World, but what goes on in the Third World is interested in affecting them.

We should be selective insofar as our involvement in Third World conflicts is concerned. As Frederick the Great observed, "He who

attempts to defend everywhere, defends nothing." Simply because we are the major free world power does not mean we have a responsibility for everything that goes wrong in the world. Qaddafi's invasion of Chad was an example. The French had far more assets in Chad than we did, and they very appropriately assumed the responsibility for countering Qaddafi. That they have found him a difficult nut to crack does not mean that we could or should have done any better. But as Vietnam so clearly demonstrated, victory by a Soviet proxy in one Third World conflict encourages Soviet adventurism and leads to more aggression in other parts of the Third World. Therefore, no instance of Soviet aggression anywhere in the Third World should go unchallenged by the West.

Our goal should always be to use force as a last resort. But the capability and the will to use force as a first resort when our interests are threatened reduces the possibility of having to use force as a last resort, when the risk of casualties would be far greater. Vietnam highlighted the importance of blocking aggression early. Winston Churchill made the point that World War II was an unnecessary war because it could have been prevented by timely action against Hitler when he launched his conquests of smaller countries. But at the time European leaders did not consider them vital to their interests.

Everyone agrees that we should never commit our forces to a losing cause. But winning must be properly defined. We are a defensive power. We are not trying to conquer other countries. That is why we must have a policy in which we will fight limited wars if they are necessary to achieve limited goals. We win if we prevent the enemy from winning. The world has probably seen its last conventional war between major powers. In the end the world conflict will probably be decided by the outcome of unconventional, limited wars. A president must not be faced with the option of either waging total war or accepting total defeat.

The War Powers Acts

In the wake of Vietnam, however, Congress has tried to force presidents to make exactly that choice by passing measures that drastically curtail their ability to use limited and unconventional military power. The War Powers Act make it impossible for a President to act

swiftly and secretly in a crisis and permits Congress to pull our troops out simply by doing nothing—by failing to pass a resolution either for or against the president's action. The Foreign Assistance Act limits aid to governments that do not have squeaky-clean human rights records. Had it been in force during World War II, it would have prevented us from assisting our ally, the Soviet Union, against Hitler. The Clark Amendment of 1976, which forbade covert aid to the freedom fighters in Angola, gave Cuba and the Soviet Union the green light for their covert activities in Angola and around the world. The Boland Amendment of 1982 paved the way for the disastrous decision by Congress to cut off all covert aid to the contras fighting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. . . .

There are no limits on the Soviets' power to invade, overthrow, and undermine any non-Communist government or to arm, strengthen, and encourage any aggressive Communist government. Hamstringing our power to respond in such instances invites further aggression. Furthermore, sometimes we must assist governments that are fighting Communist aggression even if their human rights records do not meet our standards. With our assistance and influence, their people will have a chance to have some human rights; under the Communists, they will have none. And we must face up to the reality that covert war is a fact of life in the Third World. If every shipment of arms to an anti-Communist government or group requires a full-blown congressional investigation, the arms will never leave the dock, and our friends will come up empty-handed. The Soviets and their surrogates, meanwhile, will fight harder and win faster in country after country, just as they did during the late 1970s.

The outstretched hand of diplomacy will have a very weak grip unless a President holds the scepter of credible military power in his other hand. The pace and the nature of events in the modern world make it more important than ever for a president to have the ability to make expeditious use of the full range of our military and intelligence forces when the situation calls for it. He cannot wait on the 535 members of Congress to make these quick, tough decisions for him. Events will not wait for us to respond. As Charles de Gaulle observed shortly before his death, members of parliaments can paralyze policy; they cannot initiate it. Congressional leadership means leadership by consensus, and consensus leadership is no leadership. By the time a

consensus has formed, the time to act has passed. Congress is a deliberative body; its wheels grind slowly, often maddeningly so. A president, however, must look, think, and then act decisively. . . .

Our goal cannot be achieved unless several conditions are met. First, we must restore bipartisanship in foreign policy. The great foreign-affairs initiatives of the postwar years—the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan, the rebuilding of Japan—were bipartisan initiatives. Bipartisanship in foreign policy was one of the major casualties of the Vietnam War. It is crucially important that our Third World initiative begin as a bipartisan effort and stay that way. Economic development does not happen overnight, but a change of attitude in a democracy often does. Unless we decide at the outset that our effort to win the Third World war will not be a political football, there will always be the danger that in the future a president or the Congress, eyeing the next election, will punt and give the ball back to the other side.

The United States cannot afford to have its leadership bitterly divided over our policy for dealing with conflict in the Third World. On the one hand, hawks emphasize the importance of defending American interests and of helping Third World governments that are fighting the spread of Communism. On the other hand, doves emphasize the importance of helping only those governments that respect human rights and that strive for economic development with equity. Both sides are only half right.

Patience With Imperfect Regimes

If the hawks and doves take a hardheaded look at the political facts of life in the Third World, they will find themselves seeing eye-to-eye with one another. For doves this means ending their romance with the idea of revolution. Too often this has led them to lavish uncritical praise on anyone who claims to act in the name of the people, no matter how violent or destructive his actions may be. Revolutions seldom produce democracy, and in the post-World War II period, revolutions from the left never have. This does not mean that we must never support a revolutionary cause or that we should turn our backs on those striving for political and social reform. It does mean that we need to be patient with countries whose systems are imperfect, and that we should be

skeptical of those who claim they will produce the millennium overnight. While democracy works for the nations of the West, instant democracy is neither possible nor desirable for most of the Third World.

Hawks must also reexamine their position. They must recognize that there are economic and political causes of revolution. The United States could regain its military superiority over the Soviet Union and still lose the Third World war. We must disabuse ourselves of the notion that national strength is measured solely by military power and that simply by having enough of it we can feel secure. Doves must recognize that to stay on the sidelines and to fail to do what is necessary to prevent the victory of a repressive Communist regime is immoral. Hawks must understand that using the specter of the Communist threat to justify the status quo or repression by the right is also immoral. . . .

Our diplomatic initiatives should include a major effort to enlist the Soviet Union in joining us in cooling crises in the Third World. While this may seem unrealistic since the Soviet Union stirs up many of the crises and profits from most of them, we must not overlook the fact that they have other priorities as well. They want nuclear-arms control as we do. What destroyed any chance of Senate approval of SALT II was not the alleged flaws in the agreement but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There is no way the Senate will approve any agreements in the future for arms control when the Soviet Union is blatantly supporting revolutions that threaten our interests in areas like Latin America and the Mideast.

While the Soviets want the world, they do not want war. A conflict in the Third World that involved the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union could escalate into a world war. And as a major nuclear power, the Soviets are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, just as we are, and about the possibility that an international outlaw like Qaddafi might acquire such weapons.

Therefore, while they will continue to proclaim their support for wars of national liberation, they will stop short of any action that could escalate into a suicidal world war. When a nation has to make a choice between ideology and survival, survival always comes first. We should challenge the Soviet leaders to peaceful competition in the Third World. If they can produce progress for people and not just power for Third World dictators, we say, "Welcome to the club."

I do not underestimate the cost or complexity of launching a peaceful revolution for progress in the Third World. But we have the economic resources. We have the skilled manpower and the brainpower. Our national interest requires it. There is only one nagging question. British strategist Sir Robert Thompson once wrote, "National strength equals manpower plus applied resources times will." Do we have the will to undertake such a bold initiative? Americans don't like to play a role on the world stage. Vietnam eroded our will to do so. But America is a great nation. Great nations must be mature enough to accept the fact that you do not win all the time. Defeat is never fatal unless you give up, and America must never give up. We must not turn away from our responsibilities in the world. If we refuse to play a major role, the rest of the free world will be at the mercy of totalitarian aggressors.

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